Breaking GNN-based NIDS via Hard-Label Black-Box Flow Injection Attacks
Published in ESORICS, European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 2026
While Graph Neural Network (GNN)-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) excel by encoding relational traffic struc- tures, this structural dependency introduces novel adversarial vulner- abilities. Existing graph attacks remain impractical, often demanding white-box access, prohibitive query budgets, or exploit-breaking payload manipulations. To overcome these limitations, we propose a practical, hard-label black-box attack that evades detection strictly by injecting valid supplementary traffic flows, perfectly preserving the exploit’s func- tional integrity. By formulating this combinatorial challenge as a weakly submodular maximization problem, we leverage a local surrogate GNN and an influence-guided greedy search to efficiently identify highly impactful injections. We theoretically prove this approach yields a strict polynomial-time approximation guarantee. Empirically, we demonstrate the proposed flow injection attack can bypass state-of-the-art GNN-based NIDS with minimal query budgets
Recommended citation: Mouzaoui, M., Han, Y., Blanc, G., Rilling, G., Hurfin, M. (2027). Breaking GNN-Based NIDS via Hard-Label Black-Box Flow Injection Attacks. In: Spognardi, A., Sun, K., De Gaspari, F., Mancini, L.V. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2026. ESORICS 2026. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 16970. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-38702-8_13
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